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The Pregnant Employee's Appearance As a BFOQ
Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
INTRODUCTION
Even prior to the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
of 1978,1 eighteen federal district courts and seven courts of
appeals already had decided that employment practices contin-
gent on pregnancy constituted sex discrimination 2 under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 Nonetheless, the United States
Supreme Court rejected the lower courts' interpretation and held,
1. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). The Act added subsection (k) to
§ 703 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)
[hereinafter cited as the PDA].
The amendment provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of
benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but sim-
ilar in their ability or inability to work....
For a discussion of case law and legislative history, see Comment, The 1978 Amendment
to Title VII: The Legislative Reaction to the Geduldig-Gilbert-Satty Pregnancy Exclusion
Problem in Disability Benefits Programs, 27 Loy. L. REv. 532 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Legislative Reaction].
2. See H.R. REP. No. 948,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4749, 4750.
Title VII prohibits, inter alia, actions which "deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities . . . because of such individual's . . . sex. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(aX2). Pregnancy is not explicitly mentioned.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter cited as Title VII]. The
principal provision forbids employers
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrim-
inate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges or employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2.
For a discussion of its legislative history, see Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,51 MINN. L REV, 877,879-85 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Miller].
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in a series of cases, 4 that not all pregnancy-based classifications
constituted impermissible sex discrimination. The difficulty expe-
rienced by subsequent courts in determining just when employ-
ment policies attributed to pregnancy 5 were discriminatory
prompted legislative response. In. 1978, Congress passed the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act to clarify its original definition of sex
discrimination as it applies to Title VII. The Act unequivocally
defines discrimination in the job market based on pregnancy as
per se sex discrimination.
Despite Congress' explicit intent to redefine sex discrimination
to include discrimination against pregnant women, the Act left
unresolved an important issue: when is a woman's physical attrac-
tiveness, and particularly her sexual attractiveness, so integral to
her job that her employer can legally terminate her employment or
demand her leave of absence once she becomes visibly pregnant?
This article will focus on this issue. It will first discuss the judi-
cial treatment of pregnancy-related employment policies both
before and after the passage of Title VII. Second, an overview of
the three Supreme Court cases which led Congress to pass the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act will be provided. The article will
then examine the primary statutory defense employers have used
to defend themselves against charges of employment discrimina-
tion based on sex. Finally, the article will present an approach
courts should use to determine whether an employee's physical
appearance and sexual attractiveness, defined by the employer as
her continuing freedom from pregnancy, should be a sufficient
defense to relieve the employer of Title VII's prohibition against
sex discrimination.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 37-69. Numerous articles have been written on the
cases. E.g., Comment, Three Cases Against Motherhood, 2 GLENDALE L REv. 313 (1978);
Comment, Legislative Reaction, supra note 1; Comment, Sex Discrimination and Insurance
Planning: The Rights of Pregnant Men and Women Under General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
22 Sr. Louis U.L.J. 101 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Pregnant Men and Women].
5. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act states that the terms "because of sex" and "on the
basis of sex" include not only pregnancy but also childbirth and related medical conditions.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
Pregnancy-based sex discrimination can occur against women whose pregnancies have
gone full term or against those whose pregnancies result in early termination. The
employer, therefore, is also prohibited from firing or refusing to hire women who have
undergone abortions. 29 C.F.R § 1604.10 app. (1981). The Act does not require employers to
pay for abortions that are medically unnecessary. Employers must pay the expenses result-
ing from abortion only where (1) the abortion is recommended because the mother's life
would be endangered if the pregnancy were allowed to go full term and (2) medical compli-
cations result from the abortion. An employer, however, may provide abortion benefits even
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Pregnancy Discrimination
THE JUDICIAL APPROACH TO MANDATORY-LEAVE
AND EMPLOYMENT-TERMINATION POLICIES
BASED ON PREGNANCY
Conflict Among the Circuits
Prior to the passage of Title VII, the federal courts had reached
conflicting outcomes when addressing the issue of the constitu-
tionality of employment-termination and mandatory-leave policies
based on pregnancy.6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
case of Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur7 and its com-
panion case, Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board,8 because
of this division.9 Both cases involved mandatory leaves of absence
imposed on teachers after they reached their fourth and fifth
months of pregnancy, respectively. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits
had reached contrary decisions respecting the constitutionality' 0
of the mandatory-leave policies."
when the abortion is not medically necessary if he so wishes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980).
6. E.g., deLaurier v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d 674, 681-85 (9th Cir. 1978)
(mandatory-leave policies imposed on teachers at the beginning of the ninth month of
pregnancy upheld under due process and equal protection attacks); Buckley v. Coyle Pub.
School Sys., 476 F.2d 92,94 (10th Cir. 1973) (school system's policy of terminating teachers'
employment at the end of the sixth month of pregnancy presented sufficiently substantive
constitutional issues to justify a hearing on the merits); Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 349
F. Supp. 687, 690-93 (D. Conn. 1972) (teaching contract provision requiring expectant
teacher to apply for and accept leave of absence at least four months prior to expected
confinement was not a denial of equal protection), rev'd, 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973); Bravo v.
Board of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. ll. 1972) (mandatory-leave policies for teachers are
not a denial of equal protection), rev'd, 525 F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1975); Pocklington v. Duval
County School Bd., 345 F. Supp. 163, 164 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (school board's policy of demand-
ing teacher's leave of absence midway through a pregnancy is a denial of due process
because an individual teacher is not allowed an opportunity to establish her physical fitness
to continue teaching); Williams v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438,
443-45 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (school district's policy that pregnant teachers take a mandatory
leave of absence at least two months before birth violated the equal protection clause
because it singled out pregnant employees without any rational relationship to the state's
legitimate objectives); Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 330 F. Supp. 328 (W.D.
Tex. 1971), rev'd, 459 F.2d 32, 41 (5th Cir. 1972) (policy of terminating employment of
pregnant employees two months prior to delivery does not violate the equal protection
clause), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973).
7. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 638.
10. At the time these teachers were placed on mandatory leave, Title VII did not apply to
state agencies and educational institutions. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2,86 Stat. 103 (1972), subsequently amended Title VII to withdraw the
exceptions. 414 U.S. at 639 n.8.
11. 414 U.S. at 634-38.
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The Supreme Court declined this opportunity to bring preg-
nancy discrimination within the definitional ambit of sex discrim-
ination, finding, instead, that mandatory-maternity regulations
placed a constitutionally impermissible burden on the right to bear
children 12 and created an unconstitutionally irrebuttable presump-
tion that no woman was able to work beyond some arbitrary date
during her pregnancy. 13 The Court resolved the issue on due pro-
cess grounds 14 and did not reach the equal protection issue raised
by the lower courts.' 5
The Court's holding left the school board with a great deal of
control over the pregnant teacher's decision to continue working.
The board could require advance notice of pregnancy 16 and, sub-
ject to some restrictions, could require all pregnant teachers to
cease teaching at a fixed date during the final weeks of pregnancy.' 7
Moreover, the board could restrict the teacher's return to the school
term following delivery.' The Court found these employment lim-
itations valid under the due process clause. Justice Douglas, con-
curring in the result, would have used traditional equal protection
standards to uphold such broad class-wide rules for pregnant
teachers.' 9
12. Id. at 639-40.
13. Id. at 644.
14. "[Flreedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 639. See
also Ackerman, The Conclusive Presumption Shuffle, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 761, 771-98 (1977)
(discussion of the due process analysis used by the Court).
15. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 (E.D. Va. 1971),
rev'd, 474 F.2d 395, 397-99 (4th Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632 (1974); LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208, 1211-14 (N.D. Ohio
1971), vacated and rev'd, 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), affd, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, noted that most teachers are women and that a
certain percentage of them will be pregnant at any given time. He suggested that the case
should have been decided on equal protection grounds. 414 U.S. at 652-53 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). He did not address the issue of whether mandatory leaves of absence involved sex
classifications. Id. at 653 n.2.
16. Id. at 643.
17. Id. at 647 n.13. The court in deLaurier v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d
674, 682 (9th Cir. 1978) subsequently used these standards to uphold a mandatory, nine-
month maternity-leave policy under an "irrebuttable presumption" attack.
18. 414 U.S. at 648-50.
19. Id. at 656 (Douglas, J., concurring). One commentator has characterized LaFleur as
presaging the holdings of Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) and Gilbert v. General
Elec. Co., 429 U.S. 125 (1976), see infra notes 36-55, as well as expressing the Court's
unwillingness to concede deference to the guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. Comment, Pregnant Men and Women, supra note 4, at 107-10.
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Decisions Rendered After Title VII
The passage of Title VII in 1964 gave aggrieved women an
alternative theory by which to plead their cases. Actions involving
employment-termination and forced-leave policies due to preg-
nancy fared better under Title VI 20 than they had under a consti-
tutional analysis. Federal courts used a number of rationales to
strike down these employment policies. Some courts, following
guidelines set by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion,21 found mandatory-leave and employment-termination poli-
cies to be impermissible sex discrimination when the pregnant
woman was physically able to continue her work.22 Another fre-
quently used approach derived from the disparate impact theory of
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 23 The applicable analysis under
this theory is that mandatory-leave or employment-termination
20. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364, 369-71 (6th Cir.) (constructive
termination due to unwed pregnancy is prima facie violation of Title VII), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 917 (1977); Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651,653-54 (8th Cir. 1975) (firing
an employee for time off from work due to complications arising from pregnancy violates
Title VII when other employees were allowed time off without pay for illnesses); Farris v.
Bd. of Educ., 417 F. Supp. 202, 205 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (school board's mandatory-leave policy
for pregnant teachers violates Title VII); Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 330 F.
Supp. 328, 329-30 (W.D. Tex. 1971) (involuntary termination because of pregnancy made
pursuant to defendants' maternity-leave policy violates Title VII), rev'd on constit, grounds,
459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973). Contra Condit v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 558 F.2d 1176, 1176 (4th Cir. 1977) (airline's policy of requiring stewardesses
to discontinue flying as soon as they learn they are pregnant is consistent with the carrier's
duty to exercise highest degree of care for passengers' safety), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934
(1978); Harris v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 413,419-24 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (air-
line's policy of requiring flight attendants to begin unpaid maternity leave upon discovery of
pregnancy is not a violation of Title VII because it is a good faith effort on the airline's part
to protect passengers by ensuring flight attendants' maximum emergency capabilities),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980).
21. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1981). The Civil Rights Act also established the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission and charged it with the administration and enforcement of
Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(4)-(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
22. See Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364 (6th Cir.) (defendant company violated
Title VII when it termianted unwed pregnant employee due to pregnancy, not work perfor-
mance), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 917 (1977); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 511 F.2d 199, 206 (3d
Cir. 1975) (Title VII requires that a pregnant employee be considered individually on her
ability to continue work, not on characteristics generally attributed to pregnant women as a
group), vacated and remanded, 424 U.S. 737 (1976); Schattman v. Texas Employment
Comm'n, 330 F. Supp. 328, 330-32 (W.D. Tex. 1971) (mandatory-leave policy applied to
pregnant women violates Title VII when it is broadly applied to all women instead of being
applied on the basis of individual medical or job characteristics), rev'd on constit. grounds,
459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1107 (1973).
23. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The disparate impact theory developed in the context of race
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policies based on pregnancy invidiously discriminate against a
disproportionate number of women because they are based on a
characteristic unique to women.24
Other courts cited the congressional intent behind the passage of
Title VII in striking at an "entire spectrum of discriminatory prac-
tices." 25 These courts enjoined subtle forms of discriminatory
practices arising out of stereotyped assumptions as well as blatant
forms which expressly singled out women and subclasses of
women for disparate treatment. Courts following this approach
often utilized a "sex plus" rationale.
discrimination cases. After the passage of Title VII, intentional race discrimination in the
job market was made unlawful. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
Employment practices which on their face discriminated against members of a given race
quickly disappeared. 401 U.S. at 424-28.
In Griggs, the Supreme Court recognized that facially neutral employment policies, e.g.,
the requirement of a high school diploma, could nonetheless perpetuate the effects of past
discrimination. These requirements, although facially neutral and perhaps even instituted
in good faith, operated in a discriminatory manner to exclude from employment opportuni-
ties a disproportionately large percentage of the protected class. Id. at 430. Courts will thus
scrutinize the consequences of a given employment practice to determine whether it oper-
ates in a discriminatory manner. If it does discriminate by operation, the employment
practice must be shown to be related to job performance in order to avoid Title VII prohibi-
tions. Id. at 431. Accord Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-35 (1975); McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803 (1973); Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit,
Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1257 (6th Cir. 1981); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 797-800
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). See Greenspan v. Auto. Club of Mich., 495 F.
Supp. 1021, 1026-33 (E.D. Mich. 1980) for an example of a court's painstaking use of statis-
tics to arrive at the conclusion that certain facially neutral employment practices had a
disparate impact on women. See also infra note 66.
24. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 511 F.2d 199, 207-08 (3d Cir. 1975) (applying a
separate leave policy for pregnancy and another for all other instances of temporary dis-
ability is sex discrimination because pregnancy is a disability found only among women),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 737 (1976); Maclennan v. American Airlines, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 466,
470-72 (E.D. Va. 1977) (airlines "leave-upon-knowledge"-of-pregnancy policy, though it is
neutral on its face, violates Title VII because it has an adverse effect on women); Singer v.
Mahoning County Bd. of Mental Retardation, 379 F. Supp. 986 (D.C. Ohio 1974) (compelling
women to take maternity leave is sex discrimination because it is based on a condition
peculiar to their sex), aff'd, 519 F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1975).
This rationale is often restated in terms of the Satty benefit-burden distinction. See infra
text accompanying notes 55-65. See also Thompson v. Board of Ed. of Romeo Community
Schools, 526 F. Supp. 1035,1041 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (mandatory leave policy imposed without
consideration of the individual's ability to continue teaching violates Title VII because it
burdens women's employment opportunities); Greenspan v. Auto. Club of Mich., 495 F.
Supp. 1021, 1054 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (company's mandatory employment-termination policy
applied to female employees constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII because it places
a significant burden on women's employment opportunities).
25. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 511 F.2d 199, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded,
424 U.S. 737 (1976); Newman v. Delta Air Lines, 374 F. Supp. 238, 244 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Doe v.
Osteopathic Hosp., 333 F. Supp. 1357, 1361-63 (D. Kan. 1971).
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In the definitive case of Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,26 the
Supreme Court established that section 703(a) of Title VII man-
dates that equally qualified persons be given equal employment
opportunities without regard to sex.27 Accordingly, an employer
could not apply one hiring policy to men with pre-school-age chil-
dren and a different one to women in the same situation.28 Be-
cause the employment standards were not applied neutrally to
both sexes, the employment policy discriminated on the basis of
sex.29 These employment standards could withstand attack under
Title VII only if the employer could demonstrate that the existence
of conflicting family responsibilities were more relevant to a wom-
an's job performance than they were to a man's. 30
Courts have subsequently utilized this "sex plus" theory to hold
a wide variety of employment criteria applied to one sex but not the
other to be impermissible sex discrimination. 31 Employment crite-
ria that burden a person because of immutable characteristics or
burden that person's fundamental rights have been struck down
under the prohibitions of Title VII.32 Courts have utilized this ra-
tionale to hold that mandatory-leave or termination policies based
on pregnancy impermissibly discriminate against women, because
pregnancy is a condition peculiar to the female sex.33 As a whole,
26. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
27. Id. at 544.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Harper v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 619 F.2d 489,492-93 (5th Cir. 1980) (requirement that
employee sustain a normal menstrual cycle before she could return to work from maternity
leave); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983,990-94 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (male superior's sexual advan-
ces constituted sex discrimination); Allen v. Lovejoy, 553 F.2d 522, 524 (6th Cir. 1977)
(plaintiff suspended from work without pay when she did not change employment records
to show her husband's name rather than her birth-given name); Sprogis v. United Airlines,
Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (female but not male employees discharged upon
marriage), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (requirement that female lobby attendant wear sexually provocative
uniform).
32. Singer v. Mahoning County Bd. of Mental Retardation, 379 F. Supp. 986, 988-89
(D.C. Ohio 1974) (mandatory pregnancy-leave policy violates Title VII because it is based on
a physical condition peculiar to sex), affd, 519 F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1975); Doe v. Osteopathic
Hosp., 333 F. Supp. 1357, 1362 (D. Kan. 1971) (employee's termination because of unwed
pregnancy is sex discrimination under Title VII because pregnancy is a condition peculiar
to the female physiology). But cf. In re National Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 269, 275 (S.D.
Fla. 1977) (airline's weight requirement does not violate Title VII because weight, unlike
height, is not an immutable characteristic). See also infra note 79.
33. E.g., Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 369 (4th Cir. 1980) (Eastern's
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the courts were moving in a single direction, holding that
employment-termination and mandatory-leave policies based on
pregnancy were illegal under Title VII as long as a woman was
physically able to perform her job duties safely and effectively.
THE SUPREME COURT CASES
The Supreme Court injected uncertainty into this developing
area of law by handing down three decisions in the mid-1970's.
Read together, this triad of cases stood for the proposition that not
all dissimilar treatment in the job market based on pregnancy
classifications constituted prima facie cases of sex discrimination
under Title VII. The major impact of these cases was to allow the
lower federal courts to enforce Title VII's prohibition on a case by
case basis, the same approach the courts had used under a consti-
tutional analysis. In retrospect, the grounds for some of the deci-
sions worked to perpetuate what have been recognized as overly
broad myths about pregnant women. 34
The first of the three Supreme Court cases, Geduldig v. Aiello,35
came before the Court on a motion to stay pending appeal of the
district court's enjoinment of a state statute. The plaintiff had
challenged the constitutionality of a provision in California's dis-
ability insurance system which dealt with the payment of benefits
to temporarily disabled employees. 36 The provision excluded from
"neutral" mandatory maternity-leave requirements affected only one class of employees-
females-and had a disparate impact on their employment opportunities), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 965 (1981); Singer v. Mahoning County Bd. of Mental Retardation, 379 F. Supp. 986,
988-89 (D.C. Ohio 1974) (discrimination is not to be tolerated under the guise of physical
properties possessed by one sex), affd, 519 F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1975).
34. deLaurier v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d 674, 678-81 (9th Cir. 1978)
(potential dangers to the health of both mother and fetus in the last month of pregnancy,
the woman's impaired ability and physical condition (fatigue, increased irritability, awk-
wardness) to perform "multifarious" teaching duties as the delivery date approaches, and
the inability to predict the time of birth justify a mandatory-leave policy imposed on all
teachers at the beginning of the ninth month of pregnancy); Schattman v. Texas Employ-
ment Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32, 39-40 (5th Cir. 1972) (mandatory-leave policy passed constitu-
tional muster because the teacher was discharged not because she was female or pregnant
but, rather, because pregnancy was advanced. Women advanced in pregnancy "are fre-
quently given to headaches, little irritable things; their personalities change ... and they are
not only hard to live with but they are hard to employ .... ), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107
(1973); Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 349 F. Supp. 687, 691 (D. Conn. 1972) (mandatory-
leave policy for teachers does not infringe on the right to bear children but on the right to
decide when to become "physically disabled" and accordingly not able to teach).
35. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
36. Id. at 486-87. The insurance program was funded entirely from contributions
deducted from wages of participating employees; participation was mandatory unless the
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the coverage disabilities resulting from pregnancy.37 The Court
held that the provision did not violate the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 38 Rather, the Court found that Cali-
fornia had simply chosen to insure some but not all risks.39 The
Court concluded that the selection of insured risks did not discrim-
inate against either sex in terms of the aggregate risk protection:
there was no risk from which men were protected and women were
not and none from which women were protected and men were
not.4a Consistent with the equal protection clause, the Court noted,
a state could address a problem on a step-by-step basis, applying a
remedy to a selected aspect of the field while simultaneously neg-
lecting others. 41
In a short footnote, the Court explained that discrimination
based on pregnancy is not sex discrimination. 42 California's insu-
rance program simply removed "an objectively identifiable physi-
cal condition with unique characteristics" from the list of covered
disabilities. 43 It divided potential recipients "into two groups-
pregnant women and nonpregnant persons." 44 Furthermore, rea-
employee was protected by a voluntary, state-approved, private plan. Id. at 487.
37. Id. at 486, 489. Disabilities resulting from dipsomania, drug addiction, or sexual
psychopathology, however, were compensational. Id. at 488. Disabilities resulting from
voluntary cosmetic surgery, from sterilization and from sex-unique conditions of prostatec-
tomies and circumcision were also compensational. Id. at 500.
38. Id. at 497.
39. Id. at 496.
40. Id. at 495-97. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, dissented
on the basis that California's plan applied one set of rules to females and another to males.
In denying compensation for disabilities caused by pregnancy, California imposed a limita-
tion upon the disabilities for which women could recover while men received full compensa-
tion for all disabilities, including those which affected only or primarily their sex. The
dissenting justices found this dissimilar treatment of men and women on the basis of
physical characteristics "inextricably linked to one sex" to be sex discrimination. They
noted that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had issued guidelines designed
to prohibit the disparate treatment of pregnancy disabilities in the employment context.
Finally, the dissenters criticized the majority for abandoning the stricter standard of scru-
tiny articulated in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) without explaining what differentiated the instant gender-based classification from
those found unconstitutional in Reed and Frontiero. Id. at 497-504 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 496. The Court stated that the state's legitimate interests in maintaining the
self-supporting nature of its insurance program, in distributing resources in a manner
which kept benefit payments at an adequate level for covered disabilities, and in maintain-
ing the contribution rate at a level which would not unduly burden participating employees
provided an objective and noninvidious basis for California's decision not to create a more
comprehensive insurance program.
42. Id. at 496-97 n. 20.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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soned the Court, the program's fiscal and actuarial benefits
accrued to both sexes; although the first group was exclusively
female, the latter included both males and females. 45
Geduldig gave lower federal courts an obvious rationale for hold-
ing that pregnancy-based classifications were not per se discrimi-
natory. Some courts, however, sought to distinguish Geduldig by
confining its application to suits brought under the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. 46 Thus, if a plaintiff
elected to sue under Title VII, a court might ignore Geduldig,
decide the issue' on the basis of statutory interpretation and hold
that pregnancy-based discrimination was indeed gender dis-
crimination.
45. Id. In summary, the Court stated that because the equal protection clause does not
compel the state to create a more comprehensive insurance program than it had, Califor-
nia's insurance plan passed muster even though the state's classification denied benefits on
the basis of the sex-unique trait of pregnancy. Id. at 496-97. The Court recognized, however,
that a different result would be reached if the distinctions based on pregnancy were a
pretext used to discriminate against either sex. Id. at 497 n.20.
46. The Second Circuit's approach in Communications Workers v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1033 (1977) is representa-
tive. Plaintiffs brought suit under Title VII, seeking declaratory, injunctive and monetary
relief against AT&T for its discrimination against female employees respecting rights,
benefits, and privileges afforded women under temporary disability due to pregnancy and
childbirth. Id. at 1025-26. While a motion concerning class certification was pending before
the district court, the Supreme Court decided Geduldig. The court then requested briefs and
heard arguments on the issue of whether the Title VII complaint should be dismissed in
light of Geduldig. The district court concluded that Geduldig controlled and dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted under Title VII. Id. at
1026-27.
The district court certified to the appellate court the question of whether Geduldig had
established that disparity between treatment of pregnancy-related and other disabilities did
not constitute sex discrimination within the prohibition of either Title VII or the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 1027. The Second Circuit restated the issue as whether Geduldig required
the complaint's dismissal as a matter of law for failure to state a claim for which relief could
be granted under Title VII. Id. The court found that the district court had erred in holding
that Geduldig was controlling because Geduldig had involved a challenge under the equal
protection clause, not Title VII. Id. at 1028.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir.
1975), aff'd, 434 U.S.136 (1977) explained its refusal to find Geduldig (Aiello) controlling as
follows:
It is apparent from our reading of footnote 20 that the Court's observations are
made in the particular and narrow confines of the state's power to draw flexible
and pragmatic lines in the social welfare area. To conclude that the Court's foot-
note is dispositive of an action brought under Title VII would be to ignore the
traditional doctrine that the precedential value of a decision should be limited to
the four corners of the decisions' factual setting. The reasoning and policy behind
this doctrine are readily appreciated when Aiello is compared with the facts in
this case. Here, the question is whether the exclusion by a private employer of
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The Supreme Court specifically rejected the lower courts' at-
tempts to distinguish between statutory and constitutional analy-
sis in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.47 In Gilbert, the plain-
tiffs challenged a disability plan General Electric Company pro-
vided to its employees. They alleged that the plan violated section
703(a)(1) 48 of Title VII by paying benefits for nonoccupational
sickness and accidents, but denying benefits for absence due to
pregnancy.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had ruled for the plaintiffs,
holding that Geduldig did not control because the case involved a
statutory violation, not a constitutional denial of equal protec-
tion.49 The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, holding that
the equal protection analysis of Geduldig did apply to Title VII
cases. The Court reasoned that because Congress had not defined
the term "discrimination" 50 in Title VII, the concepts found in the
pregnancy-related disabilities from its sick leave and seniority program is a viola-
tion of a congressional statute, essentially, a dissimilar question from the issue
before the Aiello Court-whether a legislative classification dividing disabilities
into two classes for the purposes of a disability income protection program finds a
rational basis. It is this very degree of dissimilarity that rejects a blind adherence
to footnote 20. To import a different effect to footnote 20 would be to extend the
impact of Aiello beyond its intended effect.
Id. at 853-54 (footnotes omitted). Accord Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 528 F.2d
1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 434 U.S. 158 (1977); Gilbert v. General
Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego
School Dist., 519 F.2d 961, 964 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1037 (1977); Wetzel v.
Liberty Mut. Ins., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on juris. grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
Other Title VII cases, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), where the Court held
that constitutional standards and Title VII standards are not the same, support this
proposition.
47. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). It provides in pertinent part that it is
unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate... with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... "
49. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 665-69 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125
(1976).
50. Id. at 133. See also Miller, supra note 3, at 879-85 (contains a general discussion of the
legislative history respecting the inclusion of the mandate against sex discrimination).
51. 429 U.S. at 35. The Court found no impermissible pretext because pregnancy is often
a desired and voluntarily undertaken condition, "not a 'disease' at all ..." Id. at 136. The
Court found in these characteristics a neutral basis for the pregnancy exclusion which
vitiated any claim of sexually discriminatory pretext. Id. But cf. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins.,
511 F.2d 199,204-05 (3d Cir. 1975) (Congress intended that Title VII eliminate any artificial
or arbitrary barrier to employment. Discrimination based on "stereotypes and overly cate-
gorized distinctions between men and women" is forbidden by Title VII. A maternity-leave
policy that is applied only to women is based on generalizations about the female sex. Such
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equal protection case law were relevant to its interpretation. The
Court accordingly superimposed the equal protection analysis of
Geduldig onto the plaintiffs' Title VII sex discrimination claim
based on pregnancy. The Court found that sex discrimination does
not exist under Title VII unless a plaintiff demonstrates that the
allegedly discriminatory pregnancy-based classifications are in
fact a pretext for sex discrimination 5' or operate in effect to dis-
criminate against members of one of the sexes. 52
The effect of Gilbert was to overrule other recent cases which
had held that employment discrimination against pregnant
women did in fact constitute sex discrimination in violation of
Title VII. 53 In summary, Gilbert left the courts without clear
guidelines in determining when employment practices based on
pregnancy were in fact instances of sex discrimination. 54
a policy treats pregnancy different from other temporary disabilities and violates Title VII),
vacated and remanded, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
52. 429 U.S. at 137. Although the Court indicated that a Title VII violation could be
demonstrated in some instances upon proof that the effect of an otherwise facially neutral
plan or classification discriminated against members of one of the sexes, the plaintiffs in
this instance failed to establish that the selection of compensational risks operated to
discriminate against women. Id. at 13& The program's fiscal and actuarial benefits accrued
to members of both sexes, covering the same category of risks for each. Id, Sex discrimina-
tion did not occur simply because women disabled by pregnancy did not receive benefits. Id.
Rather, the plan was merely underinclusive; pregnancy disabilities were an additional risk
confined to women. Id. at 138-39. Failure to compensate for this risk did not destroy the
parity of benefits accruing to both sexes which resulted from the "facially even-handed"
coverage of risks. Id. at 139. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
because it found no sex discrimination as that term was defined in Geduldig and no show-
ing of sex-based discriminatory effect in violation of § 703 (aX1). Id. at 137. In effect, the
Court concluded that pregnancy-based discrimination, absent a finding of discriminatory
effect, is not discriminatory treatment based on sex. Id. Recognizing that only women can
become pregnant, the Supreme Court nonetheless reaffirmed that not all pregnancy-based
classifications are based on sex. Id. at 36. See the dissenting opinion for a summary of the
evidence concerning General Electric's history of discriminatory treatment of female
workers. Id. at 147 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. See, e.g., Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 528 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1975),
vacated and remanded, 434 U.S. 158 (1977) (per curiam); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522
F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego School
Dist., 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1037 (1977); Communications
Workers v. American Tel. & Tel., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 429
U.S. 1033 (1977); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on juris.
grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976). See also S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1977).
54. Mitchell v. Board of Trustees of Pickens County School Dist., 599 F.2d 582 (4th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 965 (1979) illustrates the difficulty courts experienced in con-
forming with Supreme Court mandates. School officials used knowledge of a teacher's
pregnancy to decline to renew her contract for the following year. Id. at 583. The district
court initially granted the defendant school officials summary judgment under Title VII but
then entered judgment for plaintiff on the basis of Gilbert and Griggs. Id. at 584.
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In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,55 the last of the Supreme
Court triad, the Court attempted to correct some of the confusion
generated by Geduldig and Gilbert by attempting to clarify the
standard for determining when pregnancy-based classifications
constitute sex discrimination. The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to decide, in light of Gilbert, whether the district court and the
court of appeals had properly applied Title VII to Nashville Gas's
employment policies respecting pregnancy. 56
Nashville Gas required all its pregnant employees to take a for-
mal leave of absence without sick pay.5 7 Moreover, pregnant
employees on such leave lost their accumulated seniority upon
their return to work.58 In holding that the denial of accumulated
seniority to employees returning from mandatory pregnancy leave
violated section 703(a)(2) of Title VII,59 the Court qualified Gilbert
by distinguishing between employee "benefits" and "burdens."
Even though Gilbert did not require that greater economic benefits
be paid to one sex because of its "differing role" in life,60 the
employer's facially neutral seniority policy violated Title VII
When the Supreme Court reversed Gilbert, the district court withdrew its then extant
judgment. The court reached a different conclusion of law but retained its conclusions of
fact, concluding that the defendants' unwritten policy of the nonrenewal of pregnant
teachers' contracts did not constitute gender-based discrimination and was not shown to be
gender-based in effect. Id. at 585-86. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the district
court had read Gilbert too broadly. Id. at 586.
See also Harris v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 413,429 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (the
court found that Gilbert stood for two propositions: (1) exclusion of pregnancy coverage
from a general disability insurance program is not per se sex-based discrimination in viola-
tion of Title VII and (2) pregnancy-based classifications do not violate Title VII, unless they
are either "mere pretexts" for sex discrimination or produce a sex-based effect), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980); In re National Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 249, 256
(S.D. Fla. 1977) (pursuant to the Supreme Court holding in Gilbert that classifications based
on pregnancy are not per se sex discrimination, the court determined whether the defend-
ant's maternity-leave policy constituted sex discrimination). See generally Barkett, Preg-
nancy Discrimination-Purpose, Effect, and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 16J. OF FAM. L 401
(1978).
55. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
56. Both lower courts had found that Nashville Gas's policies violated Title VII. Satty v.
Nashville Gas Co., 384 F. Supp. 765 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), affd, 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975).
57. 434 U.S. at 137.
58. Id. at 138.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(aX2) (1976). This provision prohibits an employer "to limit, segre-
gate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive. ., any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."
60. 434 U.S. at 142.
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because it deprived women of their accumulated seniority on the
basis of their sex by "impos[ing] on women a substantial burden
that men need not suffer."6 1
Despite the Court's ruling, Satty did not establish that all
pregnancy-based distinctions were per se discriminatory and
violated Title VII on the basis of sex. By framing its holding in
terms of the "benefit-burden" dichotomy, the Court indicated that
some but not all instances of pregnancy-based classifications vio-
lated Title VII. Thus, the federal courts were left to make a case-by-
case determination of sex discrimination by finding a discrimina-
tory effect.62 After Satty, it seemed clear that employers could dis-
criminate on the basis of pregnancy so long as they maintained
the facial neutrality of their employment policies. 63
The Satty decision left still another opening. Even if a plaintiff
established a prima facie case of sex discrimination by providing
enough statistical evidence for the court to find a sex-based dis-
criminatory effect, an employer could still prevail by demonstrat-
61. Id.
62. The Court's rationale is consistent with its approach to other cases of disparate
impact whereby courts have recognized that facially neutral employment requirements can
operate in a discriminatory manner to exclude from employment a disproportionately large
percentage of the protected class. A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate
impact by putting enough statistical evidence into the record to demonstrate that the chal-
lenged practice, although facially neutral because no particular group is singled out for
dissimilar treatment, nonetheless excludes a disproportionately large number of a given
class. Examples are not hiring an individual unless he or she is 5'10" and weighs 150
pounds, or has a high school diploma. The first requirement effectively eliminates 99% of
female applicants. 1 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 12.21 at 3-30 (1982). The
latter, at one time, eliminated a disproportionately large percentage of blacks. Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The business necessity defense is applied to cases of
disparate impact. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
63. "Facial neutrality" meant that the employer could separate employees into classes
based on pregnancy/non-pregnancy but not based on sex per se. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20. Accord General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The Court's
mistaken premise is that pregnancy-based classifications are facially neutral. Although the
employment policy does not explicitly refer to sex as such, pregnancy-based employment
policies and practices concern a physical characteristic that is exclusively possessed:by only
one sex. "Such dissimilar treatment of men and women, on the basis of physical character-
istics inextricably linked to one sex, inevitably constitutes sex discrimination." Geduldig,
417 U.S. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also 1 A. RSON, supra note 62, §§ 12.00-12.22.
The recognition that pregnancy-based classifications are in fact sexually discriminatory
on their face renders such classifications as instances of disparate treatment, not disparate
impact. "'Disparate treatment'... is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 367 (4th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981).
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ing that the employment policy was motivated by a business
necessity.6 4 According to the Court, the defendant in Satty had
lost by failing to demonstrate that the employment policy resulted
from a business necessity.6 5 Satty thus made it clear that plain-
tiffs who alleged pregnancy-based discriminatory treatment had
to establish that these pregnancy classifications had a disparate
impact on women in order to bring them within Title VII's defini-
tional ambit of sex discrimination. 66 Although Satty indicated
that some instances of pregnancy classifications did violate Title
VII, the case left the courts without any judicial guidelines in
deciding whether a given employment practice was a benefit or burden6 7
and accordingly constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title
VII.
64. 434 U.S. at 141-43. The Supreme Court developed the business necessity defense
because it recognized that facially neutral employment practices may nonetheless operate
tb render ineligible a disproportionate number of a given class. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. at 429. Because the Court did not want to insulate this subtle and perhaps even
unintentional discrimination from Title VII's remedial action, it held that employment
practices which impacted disparately on protected classes were unlawful unless shown to be
job related.
Proof of a discriminatory motive or invidious intent is not required under the disparate
impact theory. Id. at 429-33. Rather, the focus is on the effect of a given employment practice
to determine whether it operates to exclude a disproportionate percentage of a given class. If
the employment practice does operate to exclude a disproportionate number of the protected
class, the employer may nonetheless prevail by showing that the challenged employment
practice is necessary to the operation of the business. See supra note 23.
The test of business necessity is whether an overriding business purpose makes the
employment practice necessary to promote the safe and efficient job performance and oper-
ation of the business. The business necessity must be sufficiently compelling to override its
disparate effect on the protected class. The defendant has failed to establish a successful
business necessity defense as long as an acceptable alternative practice would better or
equally accomplish the asserted business purpose with a lesser discriminatory effect on the
protected classes. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331-32 (1977); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-33 (1971); Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d
1251, 1260-62 (6th Cir. 1981); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). See also Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974).
65. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 143 (1977). The Court reaffirmed Gilbert
with respect to the denial of sick pay to pregnant employees. As in Gilbert, the Court left
open the possibility that the presentation of evidence could indicate that the pregnancy
exclusion was a "pretext designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the
members of one sex or the other." Id at 144.
Although finding it difficult to perceive how the exclusion of pregnancy from a disability-
insurance or sick-leave compensation plan would deprive employees of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise affect their employment status, id, the Court conceded that General
Electric Company's refusal to allow pregnant employees to retain their accumulated senior-
ity might be relevant to the trier of fact in deciding whether the sick-leave plan was a pretext
designed to effect an invidious sex discrimination. Id. at 145.
66. Id. at 139-43.
67. See H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
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THE EFFECT OF THE
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT
Congress reacted to Geduldig-Gilbert-Satty pronouncements by
amending Title VII.6 8 The amendment, the Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act of 1978 (PDA), provides that sex discrimination, as
defined under Title VII, includes pregnancy discrimination. 9 By
defining pregnancy-based discrimination as a per se violation
under Title VII, the PDA clarified and reaffirmed Congress' origi-
nal intent to protect working women against all forms of sex dis-
crimination, including those based on the sex-unique trait of preg-
nancy.70 Thus, Congress overturned Gilbert71 and substi-
tuted for Satty's benefit-burden test a per se finding that preg-
nancy-based discrimination is a prima facie case of sex dis-
crimination.7 2
AD. NEWS 4749, 4751.
68. See H.R. 6075, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 995, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The
House approved its bill on July 18, 1978. The Senate version had been passed in the summer
of 1977. The Conference Committee issued its report on October 13, 1978, see CONG. REP. No.
1786, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978). President Carter signed the amendment on October 31,
1978. See also Comment, Eberts v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.: Gender-Based Discrimina-
tion After Gilbert and Satty, 12 J. MAR J. PRAC. & PRoc. 459, 468 n.53 (1979).
69. S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st. Sess. 1-3 (1977). See generally Comment, Legislative
Reaction, supra note 1.
70. See Thompson v. Board of Educ. of Romeo Community Schools, 526 F. Supp. 1035,
1039-40 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (the PDA establishes that policies which create classifications or
discriminate on the basis of pregnancy are Title VII violations unless the employer estab-
lishes a bona fide occupational qualification).
71. See EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 524 F. Supp. 1141, 1142 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (the
PDA was meant to rectify Gilbert by expressly providing that sex discrimination in
employment includes the dissimilar treatment of female employees from their male coun-
terparts on the basis of the formers' capacity to become pregnant); Somers v. Aldine Indep.
School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 900,902-03 (S.D. Tex. 1979), afrid, 620 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1980) (the
PDA clarifies Congress' original intent to include pregnancy-based discrimination in its
mandate against sex discrimination in employment, explicitly rejects the Supreme Court's
Gilbert and Satty holdings, and endorses the opinion of the dissenting Justices in Gilbert as
the correct interpretation of Title VII). See also H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-6,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4749,4749-54; S. REP. No. 331,95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1977).
72. Satty failed to outline a systematic approach to distinguish between pregnancy-
based burdens which violate Title VII from those which do not. Accordingly, the decision
imparted little guidance on whether a court would apply a "benefit" or "burden" label to any
given employment practice. H.R. REP. No. 948,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4749, 4751. See Franchen Veterans Admin. Medical Center, 507 F.
Supp. 124, 126 (E.D. Ark. 1981). Congress also indicated that the guidelines of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1981) [hereinafter cited as EEOC
guidelines], and not the Supreme Court's position, correctly interpreted Title VII's intent to
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Under the PDA, employment-termination and mandatory-leave
policies based on pregnancy are per se sex discrimination and
presumptively in violation of Title VII.7 3 This redefinition of sex
discrimination has a dual effect. First, it enables a plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination 74 if she demon-
strates that she was accorded dissimilar treatment because of her
pregnancy. She need only demonstrate that she was discharged or
forced to take a leave of absence at a time when she was able to
perform her job duties safely and efficiently. 75 Once the plaintiff
bar sex discrimination based on dissimilar treatment of pregnancy in the job market. S.
REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977).
In Gilbert, the Supreme Court had refused to follow the guidelines because the EEOC's
position conflicted with its earlier pronouncements. 404 U.S. at 141-45. The Court had stated
in earlier cases that, although the EEOC guidelines were not administrative regulations
promulgated by formal procedures, the guidelines nonetheless constituted the interpretation
of the enforcing agency and were accordingly entitled to "great deference." Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1971);
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545-47 (1971). See generally Comment, The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 and the EEOC Guidelines: A Return to "Great
Deference"?, 41 U. Prrr L REv. 735 (1980).
73. To help the courts interpret and apply the amendment, the EEOC promulgated
amended guidelines. 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1981). The guidelines state in part the following:
Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment against women affected by
pregnancy or related conditions... [Wlomen affected by pregnancy or related
conditions must be treated the same as other applicants and employees on the
basis of their ability or inability to work. A woman is therefore protected against
such practices as being fired ... merely because she is pregnant .... She usually
cannot be forced to go on leave as long as she can still work....
Title VII has always prohibited an employer from firing . .. a woman
because of pregnancy or related conditions....
Id. § 1604 app. (1981).
74. Plaintiff must carry the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of sex discrimi-
nation. E.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-60 (1980);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,802 (1973). Proof of discriminatory motive
is essential to the establishment of the plaintiffs case, but discriminatory motive can often
be inferred from the existence of the dissimilar treatment. See, eg., Chrisner v. Complete
Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1257 (6th Cir. 1981); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633
F.2d 361,372-73 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981).
The appropriate model for a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment necessarily
varies with the facts of each case. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 253-54 & n.6 (1980); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973);
Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228,232-36 (5th Cir. 1969).
75. When the plaintiffs disability is in issue, the plaintiff need only demonstrate that
she was disabled due to pregnancy, her employment was terminated or she was suspended
because of her pregnancy, and others were not so treated when they were disabled by
conditions other than pregnancy. Pregnancy-related disabilities must be treated as other
temporary disabilities. Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, 514 F.2d 651, 653 (8th Cir. 1975);
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has demonstrated a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment,
the burden shifts to the defendant to establish a defense.76
Secondly, because the PDA redefines sex discrimination to
include pregnancy discrimination, pregnancy discrimination cases
are disparate treatment, 77 not disparate impact,7 8 cases. Accord-
ingly, the employer's only defense against a finding of sex discrim-
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 511 F.2d 199, 205-07 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 424
U.S. 737 (1976).
Evidence that other women were discharged or forced to take leave after an employer
learned that they were pregnant establishes a discriminatory policy against pregnant
women. Jacob v. Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364 (6th Cir. 1977) (citing 29 C.F.R. §
1640.10(a)), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 917 (1977); Halthaus v. Compton & Sons, 514 F.2d 651,
653-54 (8th Cir. 1975). See generally Comment, Maternity Leave and Employment: Com-
pliance with Title VII Mandates, 33 BAYLOR L lav. 181 (1981).
The plaintiff does not have to show that the employer's discrimination against pregnant
women is consistent and frequent enough so as to constitute an employment policy. Rather,
because Title VII prohibits discrimination against individuals, the employer may be guilty
of sex discrimination even though he has discriminated against only one employee. Barnes
v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983,992-95 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (a single instance of sex discrimination may
form the basis of a private suit); Doe v. Osteopathic Hosp., 333 F. Supp. 1357, 1362 (D. Kan.
1971) (defendant's act of discharging an unwed, pregnant employee violated Title VII even
though no other known females were discharged due to unwed pregnancy within five years
preceding plaintiffs termination).
76. E.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,253 (1980); McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
408 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1969).
77. Disparate treatment is discriminatory on its face. It is express and blatant discrimi-
nation. An employer treats people disparately and less favorably than others when he or
she refuses to hire a person solely and expressly on the basis of those characteristics which
define one of Title VII's protected classes of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
For example, in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), plaintiff contended that the
refusal to hire her for the position of guard in a maximum security prison for men because
she is a woman violates Title VII because the refusal is explicitly based on sex. Using a
disparate impact theory, the plaintiff argued that 1) a statutory minimum height and
weight requirement for prison guards constituted sex discrimination because it eliminated a
disproportional number of women from the job and 2) Alabama's outright refusal to hire
women as prison guards constituted sex discrimination.
The Supreme Court upheld the district court's finding that the application of statutory
height and weight requirements did constitute impermissible sex discrimination. Id. at
327-32. In justifying Alabama's outright refusal to hire women as prison guards, however,
the Court noted that the essence of the job was to maintain prison security. A woman's
ability to maintain security in a male penitentiary, housing sex offenders and other male
inmates deprived of a normal heterosexual environment was undermined, according to the
Court, by her "womanhood." The Court thereby concluded that being male was a BFOQ,
see infra note 82 and accompanying text, for "contact positions" in a maximum security
prison. 433 U.S. at 335. For a critical discussion of Dothard, see generally Comment, Title
VII: Sex Discrimination and a New Bona Fide Occupational Qualification-How Bona
Fide? 30 U. FLA. L REv. 466 (1978).
78. Before the passage of the PDA, the Supreme Court's refusal to define pregnancy
discrimination as sex discrimination necessitated the use of the disparate impact theory to
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ination is that sex is a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) reasonably necessary for the normal operation of the par-
ticular business or enterprise.7 9
The BFOQ is an express Title VII exemption. This defense
allows employers to justify the dissimilar treatment accorded to
pregnant employees and to openly discriminate on the basis of sex
without violating Title VII.80 To establish a BFOQ defense, the
employer must persuade the court that all or substantially all
members of the disfavored class cannot perform their job duties
establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination. See supra note 23. The plaintiff had the
burden of putting enough statistical evidence into the record to show that the pregnancy
employment practice operated invidiously against women.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter ited as BFOQ]. The statute
provides in relevant part:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees.... on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particu-
lar business or enterprise....
For a discussion of the differing judicial articulations of the defense, see generally Com-
ment, Sex Discrimination and a New Bona Fide Occupational Qualification-How Bona
Fide?, 30 U. FLA. L. REv. 466 (1978); Comment, Dothard v. Rawlinson: A Method of Analysis
for Future BFOQ Cases, 16 URB. L ANN. 361 (1979).
Courts have not always adhered to the distinction that the BFOQ is a statutory defense to
discriminatory treatment cases whereas the business necessity defense applies to disparate
impact cases. See supra notes 23, 64. For instances of courts applying one or the other or
both defenses, see e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Burwell v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981);
Harris v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 413 (N.D. Cal. 1977), modified, 649 F.2d
670 (9th Cir. 1980). See also Comment, Exclusionary Employment Practices in Hazardous
Industries: Protection or Discrimination?, 5 COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 97, 141 n.170 (1978); Com-
ment, Sex Discrimination: Theories and Defenses Under Title VII and Burwell v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 83 W. VA. L. REv. 605 (1981).
The discussion in this text adheres to the distinction that the statutory bona fide occupa-
tional qualification defense applies to disparate treatment cases and that the business
necessity defense applies to disparate impact cases.
80. An employer's BFOQ claim simultaneously admits sex discrimination and
attempts to justify it. Although Congress and some courts refer to the provision as
the BFOQ "exception," since it is an exception to Title VII's general prohibition of
sex discrimination, the BFOQ is more accurately described as a "justification" for
sex discrimination. Thus, Title VII analysis requires a two-step process: (1) a
finding of sex discrimination and (2) if discrimination is found, an inquiry into
whether it is justified because the position requires the possession of unique sexual
characteristics for successful job performance. If a complainant fails to prove the
existence of sex discrimination, then it is unnecessary to inquire further whether a
BFOQ exists.
Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 55 TEx.
L. REv. 1025, 1026 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Sirota]. Accord 1 A. LARSON, supra note 62,
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safely and efficiently.81 If the employer succeeds in establishing
that the discriminatory policy is a BFOQ exception, then the
burden shifts to the plaintiff who must prove that the employer's
factual basis justifying the discriminatory policy is merely a pre-
text for discrimination. 82
Most federal courts have interpreted the BFOQ defense narrow-
ly.8 3 In attempting to reconcile Title VII's principle of non--
discrimination 84 with the statutory exemption permitting discrim-
ination, courts have required that each person be assessed on the
basis of individual capacities, not on stereotyped characteriza-
tions generally attributable to a group.8 5 Courts have scrutinized
§ 10.00, at 3-1.
81. [T]o rely on the bona fide occupational qualification exception an employer has
the burden of proving that he had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual
basis for believing, that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform
safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved.
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969). The Weeks "all or
substantially all" BFOQ test is frequently cited. E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
333(1977).
82. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green ... , we set forth the basic allocation of
burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging discrimina-
tory treatment. First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance
of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff suc-
ceeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejec-
tion."... Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then
have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legiti-
mate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext
for discrimination.
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1980) (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)).
The factual issues and the character of the evidence differ with the type of case: discrimi-
natory impact or discriminatory treatment. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252 n.5 and cases cited
therein.
83. The cases are replete with the observation that the BFOQ provides only the narrow-
est of exceptions to the general prohibition against sex-based discrimination. E.g., Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333-34 (1977); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219,
1227 (9th Cir. 1971); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1972); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 716 (7th Cir.
1969). Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1981).
84. The principle of non-discrimination accords with the congressional purpose to elimi-
nate subjective assumptions and traditional stereotyped notions pertaining to the protected
class's ability to perform a given job and to allow both men and women equal access to the
job market. E.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir.
1969); Harris v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 413, 426-27 (N. D. Cal. 1977).
85. E.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1971) (the BFOQ
defense does not apply when it is based on generally held assumptions about characteristics
of female workers as a class); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235-36
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employers who ostensibly seek to protect women, and particularly
pregnant women, from traditionally male tasks for which women
are presumed to be physically unfit.86
In construing the defense, courts have required the employer to
prove that only one sex can successfully perform the job. The
employer must show that successful job performance requires
characteristics belonging to one sex or to the other.8 7 Moreover,
(5th Cir. 1969) (Title VII requires that individuals be measured for the job on the basis of
individual capabilities and not on the basis of characteristics generally attributable to the
class).
The Fifth Circuit recognized, however, that an employer may sustain the burden of
justifying the discriminatory employment practice by demonstrating the impracticability of
an individualized assessment of an employee's ability to perform the job. Usery v. Tamiami
Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 n.5 (5th Cir. 1969)).
The EEOC guidelines cite the following as examples of stereotyped characterizations:
men are less capable of assembling intricate equipment and women of aggressive sales-
manship, and a higher turnover rate exists among women than among men. 29 C.F.R. §
1604.2 (1981). But see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (a woman's ability to
maintain prison security is directly reduced by her womanhood).
Such stereotyping is sufficiently in the public domain so as not to require any documenta-
tion. The following are definitive works discussing the subject. S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST
THEIR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975); S. DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (1952); B. FRIE-
DAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963); K. MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS (1969-1970).
86. The typical fact pattern is the employer's assertion that women are unable to per-
form job duties because the duties involve strenuous physical labor and/or long and incon-
venient work hours. E.g., Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 38-40 (5th Cir. 1974) (the court
remanded the case because the evidence, which consisted of the subjective doubts of male
co-workers that any woman was capable of performing the work involved, was insufficient
as a matter of law to support the finding that the male sex was a BFOQ); Rosenfeld v.
Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1971) (court rejected defendant's argument
that the job's strenuous physical demands both as to work hours and the required physical
activity rendered the male sex a BFOQ); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711,717-18
(7th Cir. 1969) (state laws imposing restrictions on the amount of weight women may lift on
the job are in conflict with Title VII where the effect of the law is not to protect but, rather, to
subject women to discrimination); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228,
232-35 (5th Cir. 1969) (privately imposed weight limitations for women are not within the
BFOQ exception); Local 246 Util. Workers Union v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp.
1262, 1264-66 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (weight lifting restrictions applicable only to women are not
permissible under Title VII). See also Powers, The Shifting Parameters of Affirmative
Action: "Pragmatic" Paternalism in Sex-Based Employment Discrimination Cases, 26
WAYNE L. REV. 1281, 1292-1301 (1980).
87. E.g., Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 39-40 (5th Cir. 1974) (defendants failed to establish
that the male sex was a BFOQ for the position of warehouseman because they did not offer
objective evidence of the female plaintiffs physical inability to perform the job's duties);
Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224-26 (9th Cir. 1971) (defendant failed to
establish that the job's strenuous physical demands render the male sex a BFOQ); Diaz v.
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385,388 (5th Cir. 1971) (defendant failed to establish
that the female sex was a BFOQ for the position of airline stewardess), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
950 (1972); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 715-18 (7th Cir. 1969) (defendant's
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courts have said that the statutory language "reasonably neces-
sary" is a business necessity test,8  not a business convenience
test; there must be a correlation between the job description and
the essence of the business operation.8 9
The business necessity test focuses on whether the essence of the
particular business is undercut by hiring members of both sexes.
Thus, the job qualifications cited by the employer as a justification
for discrimination must be reasonably necessary for the successful
performance of the job. The job qualifications must also be reason-
ably necessary for the successful operation of the business.90
adherence to state guidelines imposing weight limits on the maximum permissible weight to
be lifted by women in the course of their employment violated Title VII's prohibition against
the use of broad class stereotypes based on sex and did non constitute a BFOQ); Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232-35 (5th Cir. 1969) (court rejected contention
that women could not muster the strenuous exertion and weight lifting ability required by
the job of switchman); Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 302 (N.D. Tex.
1981) (female sex appeal is not a BFOQ for the jobs of flight attendant and airline ticket
agent). See also discussion of Dothard, supra note 77. See generally Sirota, supra note 80.
88. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
950 (1971) is the seminal case. Because Pan Am. had refused to hire male flight attendants,
the issue became whether being female was a BFOQ reasonably necessary to the airline's
normal operations. The court concluded that the essence of the airline's business was to
safely transport passengers, not to perform non-mechanical aspects of the job, e.g., provid-
ing reassurance to anxious passengers, giving personalized service and making flights as
pleasurable as possible. Id. at 387-88. Therefore, Pan Am. could not exclude all males merely
because most males could not perform these non-mechanical aspects as adequately as most
women. Id. at 388. Accordingly, the trial court's finding, that abolishing the airline's sex
qualification would eliminate the airline's best tool for screening out unsatisfactory appli-
cants, did not pass Title VII muster. Id. at 387. The essence of the business was not under-
mined by hiring members of both sexes. Pan Am. remained free to evaluate a job applicant's
ability to perform the non-mechanical functions on an individualized basis. Id. at 388.
The Diaz BFOQ business necessity test is not to be confused with the judge-made busi-
ness necessity defense which operates in cases of disparate impact. See infra notes 23, 64.
See also Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 299 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (the
business necessity test requires courts to examine the essence of the business at hand to
determine whether that essence would be frustrated by hiring both sexes for a particular
job).
89. Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 235 n.27 (5th Cir. 1976).
90. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 950 (1971), the case which first articulated the business necessity/essence test, required
a determination of what constitutes the essence of the particular business. Diaz focused on
the employer's total business operation and not on the particular employment position in
question. Another frequently used formulation of the BFOQ exception is the Weeks "all or
substantially all" test. See supra note 81; Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224,
235 & n.27 (5th Cir. 1976) (the court of appeals considered the Diaz essence test to be a
judicial refinement of the Weeks test).
One court, relying on Usery, construed the BFOQ defense to be a two-step process: "(1)
does the particular job under consideration require that the worker be of one sex only; and if
so, (2) is that requirement reasonably necessary to the 'essence' of the employer's business."
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In effectuating Congress' goal to provide both sexes with equal
access to the job market, courts have not allowed the prejudices
and preferences of co-workers, employers, and customers to justify
sex discrimination.91 The contrary position would undermine Title
VII's purpose to overcome stereotyped assumptions about the abil-
ities of the sexes to perform a particular job.
THE ISSUE
The Finding of Sex Discrimination
The PDA's redefinition of sex discrimination now makes
pregnancy-based employment practices prima facie violations of
Title VII. The Act, however, also raises a question: will the BFOQ
defense relieve the employer of Title VII's prohibitions against sex
Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 299 (N.D. Tex. 1981). See Sirota, supra
note 80, at 1042-51, who takes the position that the courts have in fact really devised several
tests in construing the BFOQ provision. The seminal cases are Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 546-47 (1971); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224 (9th
Cir. 1971); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385,387-88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 950 (1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. C., 408 F.2d 228,232-35 (5th Cir. 1969).
91. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airlines, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 950 (1971). In Diaz, the airline had put into evidence an independent survey
indicating that 79% of its passengers preferred female flight attendants. The court held that
customer preference could be taken into account only when the preference is based on the
business' inability to perform its primary service or function. Id. at 389. See also 1 A.
LARSON, supra note 62, § 15.40, at 4-29 to 4-32. Larson maintains that the reason why customer
preference does not constitute a BFOQ derives from the defense's race discrimination coun-
terpart. In the days of racial segregation, restaurant proprietors often said they themselves
would like to serve blacks but would lose most of their white clientele if they did so. See
generally Sirota, supra note 80, at 1027-33, 1055-56.
For a thorough discussion of congressional debates, case law, and the position of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on the issue of customer preference, see
Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 296-302 (N.D. Tex. 1981). The Wilson
court recognized that the Diaz court's limited recognition of customer preference applies
only where sex or sex appeal itself is the dominant service provided. 517 F. Supp. at 301.
Another instance where customer preference may constitute a BFOQ is where the customer
desires sexual privacy, e.g., disrobing, sleeping, performing bodily functions in the presence
of the opposite sex. 517 F. Supp. at 301 n.23 and cases cited herein. But see 1 A. LARSON,
supra note 62, § 14.30, at 4-7 (customer preference is to be distinguished from the individual
sensitivities and rights of privacy stemming from notions of morality, decency and
privacy).
Customer and employee preference is taken into consideration in "hair" or grooming
cases. The courts have found that discrimination on the basis of hair length and facial hair
does not constitute sex discrimination under Title VII. Accordingly, absent the existence of
sex discrimination, courts do not have to inquire into the existence of a BFOQ. See
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1088 (5th Cir. 1975) (the
applicability of the BFOQ exception will not be considered until a prima facie case of
discrimination based on sex has been established). In Wilingham, the court found an
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discrimination because the female employee's physical, and par-
ticularly her sexual, attractiveness 92 is so integral to her job?
This question cannot be resolved without recognizing the more
fundamental issue which underlies the airline attendant cases 93
and, oddly enough, the "pregnant teacher" cases.94 Unspoken and
perhaps unacknowledged in both these kinds of cases is the extent
to which society condones the commercial exploitation of human
sexuality. The exploitation, in varying degrees and forms, of this
employer's refusal to hire a male because of his long hair length to be non-discriminatory.
Id. at 1088. The court differentiated immutable characteristics and fundamental rights from
innocuous classifications, such as hair length, the latter having only an insignificant effect
on employment opportunities. Id. at 1091-92. Accord Thomas v. Firestone Tire & Ruber Co.,
392 F. Supp. 373, 374 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Morris v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 387 F. Supp. 1232,
1234 (M.D. La. 1975); Bujel v. Borman Food Stores, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 141,144 (E.D. Mich.
1974); Rafford v. Randle E. Ambulance Serv., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 316, 317-18 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
92. The kind of physical and sexual attractiveness in issue is that based on the
immutable characteristic of sex. It is captured by terms such as "sexiness" and "sex
appeal." This attractiveness does not include employer-imposed dress and grooming codes.
Dissimilar grooming standards imposed on male and female employees, such as the
requirement of shorter hair length for men than for women or that men shave off beards, do
not constitute sex discrimination. Dissimilar application of employment policies on the
basis of some characteristic other than immutable or protected characteristics fall outside
Title VII's proscription. Willingham v. Macom Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1088 (5th
Cir. 1975) (refusal to hire male because of long hair length); Thomas v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 392 F. Supp. 373, 374 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (termination of male employees for
refusal to trim hair and sideburns and to shave off moustaches); Morris v. Texas & Pac. Ry.,
387 F. Supp. 1232, 1234 (M.D. La. 1975) (male employee discharged for wearing hair in
"ponytail"); Bujel v. Borman Food Stores, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 141,145 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (male
employee discharged for refusing to cut long hair); Rafford v. Randle E. Ambulance Serv.,
Inc., 348 F. Supp. 316, 317-18 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (male employees discharged for refusal to
remove beards and moustaches). See supra note 91.
93. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 62, §§ 15.00,15.30, at 4-17, 4-23.
94. School boards often cited lofty justifications for terminating teachers' employment
or demanding their leave of absence once they became pregnant. Some asserted justifica-
tions were the continuity of classroom instruction, protection of teacher's and fetus's health,
assurance of the presence of a physically capable teacher in the classroom, and protection of
the teacher from student violence. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 640-48
(1974); Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629, 634-36 (2d Cir. 1973); Goodwin v.
Patterson, 363 F. Supp. 238, 240-41 (M.D. Ala. 1973), vacated and remanded, 498 F.2d 1400
(5th Cir. 1974); Williams v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438, 443-45
(N.D. Cal. 1972).
A close reading of some of the opinions indicates that school boards were often concerned
that school children would perceive the pregnant teacher as a sexual being. The premise
from which the Boards operated seemed to be that sex and pregnancy are "dirty."
The records in these cases suggest that the maternity leave regulations may
have originally been inspired by other, less weighty, considerations.... [Tihe rule
had been adopted in part to save pregnant teachers from embarrassment at the
hands of giggling schoolchildren; the cutoff date at the end of the fourth month
was chosen because this was when the teacher "began to show." Similarly,... a
mandatory leave rule was justified in order to insulate schoolchildren from the
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"infusion of sex" 95 is a common means of realizing a profit. Physi-
cal and sexual attractiveness often is a "partial ingredient" of the
"distinctive product" offered by business or enterprise.96
The extent to which this sexual component is promoted varies.
One extreme is sex-as-sex, exemplified by prostitution 97 and by
other forms of outright sexual gratification. At the other extreme is
concealed sexuality.98 Between these two extremes is found the
employee whose job it is to purvey vicarious or "attenuated" sex 99
to consumers.
sight of conspicuously pregnant women. One member of the school board thought
that it was "not good for the school system" for students to view pregnant
teachers, "because some of the kids say, my teacher swallowed a water melon,
things like that."
The school boards have not contended in this Court that these considerations
can serve as a legitimate basis for a rule requiring pregnant women to leave work;
we thus note the comments only to illustrate the possible role of outmoded taboos
in the adoption of the rules.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632,640 n.9 (1974). Cf. Green v. Waterford Bd. of
Educ., 473 F.2d 629, 635 (2d Cir. 1973) (the court characterized the state's asserted interest of
"avoiding classroom distractions" caused by the sight of a pregnant teacher as "almost too
trivial to mention .... Whatever may have been the reaction in Queen Victoria's time,
pregnancy is no longer a dirty word.").
95. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 62, § 15.00, at 4-17. For a scholarly discussion of the high
societal costs exacted by the commercial exploitation of sex, refer to S. BROWNMILLER, supra
note 85.
96. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 62, § 15.10, at 4-19.
97. Id. at 4-3, 44.
98. See supra note 94.
99. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 62, §§ 15.00-15.31. Traditionally and until recently, the
product of vicarious or "attenuated" sex in this culture has taken the form of sexual
exploitation and display of the female body. Id. at 4-19. See also Playboy Club Int'l, Inc. v.
Hotel & Restaurant Employees' & Bartenders' Int'l Union, 321 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(on deciding whether the Playboy Bunnies were discharged for their union activities or loss
of their "Bunny Image," the issue of sex discrimination was not even raised); State Div. of
Human Rights ex rel. Chamberlain v. Indian Valley Realty Corp., No CS-21209-70 (1970),
aff'd per curiam, (New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd.) 38 A-D.2d 890 (1972),
reprinted in K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG, H. KAY, TEXT, SEx-BASED DISCRIMINATION 634 (1974)
(the board found that the plaintiffs discharge was due to not fulfilling a condition of her
employment; properly wearing her "abbreviated" Little Fox cocktail waitress uniform. The
plaintiff had alleged that she was discharged for being flat-chested, and that this
constituted sex discrimination); St. Cross v. Playboy Club, App. No. 773 (1971) (New York
State Human Rights Appeal Bd.) at 2, reported in Sirota, supra note 80, at 1041 & n.102
(plaintiff was discharged for loss of "Bunny Image" when her youthful and fresh
appearance matured into a womanly look); Playboy Club Int'l, Inc. v. Hotel & Restaurant
Employees' & Bartenders', Int'l, Local 1, 74-2 Lab Arb. Awards, 5063 (1974) (Turkus, Arb.)
(Playboy Bunnies terminated for loss of "Bunny Image"). Contra Guardian Capital Corp. v.
New York State Div. of Human Rights, 46 A.D.2d 832, 360 N.Y.S. 937 (1974) (restaurant
owner not allowed to fire waiter in order to hire waitresses and attire them in "alluring"
costumes in the belief that the restaurant's food sales volume would increase), appeal
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Physical and sexual attractiveness is a partial factor in any
number of jobs. Positions as a waitress, hostess, receptionist, or
airline stewardess are obvious examples. 100 Where the employee's
duties involve contact with the public, physical and sexual attrac-
tiveness is often either an express or-in most instances-an
implied prerequisite for obtaining and continuing to hold a job. 1° 1
dismissed, 36 N.Y.2d 806,369 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1975).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has used Playboy Bunnies, strippers,
and chorus girls as examples of sex as a BFOQ without apparently questioning its
"stereotyped characterization" that the purveying of diluted sex means the exploitation of
the female body. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 62, § 15.10, at 4-18 to 4-19. At least one court has
recognized that requiring a female employee, as a condition of her employment, to wear a
sexually provocative and revealing uniform is sex discrimination. The employee would not
have been required to wear the uniform but for her sex. EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F.
Supp. 599,607-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
See also Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292,302-04 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (court
rejected an attempt to establish female sex appeal as a BFOQ). The Wilson court suggested
that the better approach is to exploit the sexual attractiveness of an integrated work force.
This approach conforms with Title VII's intent "to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes." Id. Accord Sprogis v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
100. A more extreme example is the cocktail waitress in revealing and sexually provoca-
tive clothing, Although variations on the theme exist, e.g., the "Little Fox" cocktail waitress,
see supra note 99, the prototype is undoubtedly the Playboy Bunny, described by one court
as follows:
[Playboy Clubs International, Inc. ("PCI") hires many] employees, including
young women called "Bunnies," a term frequently applied to rabbits.* The
maintenance in Bunny personnel of an elusive quality known as "the Bunny
image".. . apparently depends upon the physique, attractiveness and beauty of
the girl-employee who wears on the job a rabbit-like costume of scanty dimensions,
quite unlike the fulsome attire (white gloves and formal dress) worn by the White
Rabbit in Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland. A particular employee's "Bunny
image" has been rated by PCI on a numerical scale as follows: (1) "a flawless
beauty;" (2) "exceptionally pretty, perhaps some minor flaw;" (3) "marginal or
having some correctible deficiency, which might be weight [or] a cosmetic
problem; something that is not of a more lasting, enduring, permanent nature;" (4)
"loss of or the absence of the image requirements to be employed as a bunny"....
*"Bunny" is derived from "Bun," a Scotch word signifying "tail." The Scots say of
a hare that she "cocks her bun." The word bunny is the diminutive, meaning little
or short tail and in this sense is particularly applicable to the rabbit.
Playboy Clubs Int'l. Inc. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees' and Bartenders' Int'l Union
AFL-CIO, 321 F. Supp. 704, 704-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (citations omitted). Even more extreme
examples are chorus "girls," topless waitresses, and strippers.
101. Larson refers to these jobs as purveying diluted or attenuated sex as opposed to
purveying sex-as-sex (prostitution). In the former, the sex element is only a partial
ingredient in the product marketed by the particular business, whereas a prostitute markets
sex itself. 1 A. LARSON supra note 62, § 15.00-15.20, at 4-17 to 4-18.
These examples do not involve the issue of authenticity as, for example, in the theater.
The authenticity consideration is triggered when identification with one of the sexes is the
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In some instances the purpose of the employee's attractiveness is
merely to enhance the business environment. Her presence has
"obvious cosmetic effect."'10 2 In other instances, an aspect of the
employee's job is explicitly to procure customers by her attractive-
ness.10 3 Despite these differences in degree, a partial component of
the employee's job is sex-linked. 0 4 Both situations illustrate what
could have been acknowledged in the airline-pregnancy and
teacher-pregnancy cases: sexuality may be either explicity recog-
nized or explicitly avoided.
That the gravamen of the employer's concern in some instances
is the procurement of customers by the physical, and particularly
the sexual, attractiveness of female employees is demonstrated by
the fact that the employee is terminated or forced to take a leave of
absence once she becomes visibly pregnant. The airline-pregnancy
cases illustrate this point. Underlying the various legal and safety
arguments is a concern that customers would not find pregnant
stewardesses physically and sexually attractive.10 5
job's essential requirement. Accordingly, a play producer may insist on a man to play
Hamlet and a woman to play his mother. Id § 15.10, at 4-17 to 4-18. The EEOC considers sex
a BFOQ where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity. 29 C.F.R § 1604.2 (aX2) (1981).
Larson maintains that a house of prostitution could readily establish that the female sex
of its employees is a BFOQ reasonably necessary to the "normal" operation of the business.
In this instance, a physical feature unique to one sex is essential to the job's performance. 1
A. LARSON, supra note 62, § 4.30, at 4-5.
102. See supra note 88.
103. Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Sup. 292,293 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (airline used
females dressed in high boots and hot-pants to project an image of "feminine spirit, fun and
sex appeal" in order to attract male customers to the airline); see Guardian Capital Corp. v.
New York State Div. of Human Rights, 46 A.D.2d 832, 360 N.Y.S. 937 (1974), appeal
dismissed, 36 N.Y. 2d 806,369 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1975); St. Cross v. Playboy Club, App. No. 773
(1971) (New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd.), reported in Sirota, supra note 80, at
1026.
104. These jobs thus require sex-linked and sex-neutral abilities. The aspect of physical
attractiveness is sex-linked. Other job aspects, e.g., waiting on tables and serving food and
drink are sex-neutral. The requirement of both abilities distinguishes these kinds of jobs
from those requiring sex-as-sex. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 62, at 4-3 to 4-4.
105. The airlines were always able to avoid framing the issue in these terms by focusing,
inter alia, on the high degree of care the carrier owes to passengers. Burwell v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 371-72 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); Condit v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 558 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978);
McLenna v. American Airlines, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 466, 472 (E.D. 1977); Harris v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 413,434-35 (N.D. Cal. 1977), modified, 649 F.2d 670,676-77
(1980). That the physical and sexual attractiveness of its flight attendants is really the issue
at hand is seen perhaps most clearly in Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385,
388-89 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971), where the airline sought to establish that
the female sex was a BFOQ for the position of flight attendant. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note
62, § 15.30, at 4-24 to 4-26. Only recently has an airline come forward and frankly argued
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Because the gist of the employer's concern is the employee's
perceived loss of physical and sexual attractiveness, not the mere
fact of pregnancy, it must first be determined whether the employ-
ment requirement of physical, and particularly sexual, attractive-
ness is discrimination. This employment condition does not consti-
tute sex discrimination so long as it is imposed on both men and
women. It becomes discrimination only when it is imposed on
some people because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.10 6 The discrimination, then, stems not from the innocuous
fact that the employer is demanding his employees to be physi-
cally and even sexually attractive. Rather, the discrimination
results from the imposition of the employment requirement on a
class of employees whose salient characteristic brings them within
the protective ambit of Title VII.107 Accordingly, an employer's
requiring physical and sexual attractiveness of women but not of
men or vice-versa constitutes sex discrimination because the
requirement is attached to the immutable characteristic of sex.
that feminine sex appeal is a BFOQ for the position of flight attendant. Wilson v. Southwest
Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 300 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
107. When the employment condition is not based upon a characteristic which forms
one of Title VII's classes, the type of discrimination is contingent upon on which class of
people the employer imposes the employment condition. Here, the employment condition, phys-
ical and sexual attractiveness, is not one of the characteristics protected by Title VII.
Accordingly, the employer may require all employees to be attractive without violating Title
VII. However, the employment condition is racially discriminatory when it is imposed upon
blacks but not upon white employees or upon white but not upon black employees. Sim-
ilarly, the employment condition is sexually discriminatory when it is imposed upon female
but not male employees or, conversely, upon male but not female employees. E.g., Barnes v.
Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (male supervisor's demand that female employee
submit to his sexual advances is not per se sex discrimination but constitutes sex discrimi-
nation once it is a condition of employment which he would not have exacted from a male
employee); Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975) (defendant's demand that black
employees perform cleaning chores constituted race discrimination because the same work
was not required of plaintiffs' white co-workers); EEOC v. Sage Realty Co., 507 F. Supp. 599,
607-08 (1981) (employer's job condition that female plaintiff wear a revealing and sexually
provocative costume constitutes sex discrimination because this condition would not have
been imposed but for her sex). See also Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544
(1971) (Supreme Court vacated and remanded case to determine if family obligations are
more relevant to a woman's job performance than to a man's). See also supra note 31. An
employment condition of physical and sexual attractiveness can also become discrimina-
tory when the employer requires employees to possess only certain kinds of physical fea-
tures. For example, an employer could require all employees to have blond hair and blue
eyes. This requirement is facially neutral because it does not expressly single out any
particular class of persons for dissimilar treatment. The employment condition probably
constitutes race discrimination, however, under a disparate impact theory, because it oper-
ates disproportionately to exclude blacks from eligibility for employment. E.g., Griggs v.
Pregnancy Discrimination
By redefining sex discrimination to include discrimination based
on pregnancy, the PDA expanded the application and scope of
Title VII. Consequently, employers presumptively violate Title VII
on the basis of sex when they impose the additional requirement of
freedom from pregnancy onto the requirement of physical and sex-
ual attractiveness. The next step, then, is to determine whether the
sex discrimination can be justified as a BFOQ exception.
The BFOQ Defense Against Sex Discrimination
Whether the employer can successfully establish that the em-
ployee's physical, and particularly her sexual, attractiveness is a
BFOQ exception to sex discrimination is contingent upon the
degree to which her physical and sexual attractiveness is integral
to her job. Once the employer establishes that the employee's phys-
ical and sexual attractiveness is a BFOQ, the employer can legally
terminate her employment or demand her leave of absence once
she becomes visibly pregnant unless the employer's BFOQ excep-
tion is shown to be a pretext for discrimination.'08
Where physical and sexual attractiveness is not an aspect of her
job, such as in the teaching profession, the employee cannot be
discharged or forced to take a leave of absence from her job once
she becomes visibly pregnant as long as she is able to perform her
job duties safely and efficiently.10 9 Where part of the employee's
job is to purvey vicarious or "attenuated" sex, this aspect of the job
must be the essence of the business operation in order to constitute
a BFOQ exception. The employee's physical and sexual attrac-
tiveness must be reasonably necessary for the successful perfor-
mance of the job and the successful operation of the business. The
employee's physical and sexual attractiveness, therefore, does not
constitute a BFOQ exception where the sexual component of the
job is relatively mild in both degree and intensity' 10-merely
cosmetic.
Where, however, the dominant purpose of the employee's job is
unabashedly to procure customers by her physical and sexual
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971) (requirement of passing aptitude tests and
possessing a high-school education constituted race discrimination); Robinson v. Lorillard
Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798-800 (4th Cir. 1971) (defendant's seniority system constituted
race discrimination because it continued to impact disproportionately on blacks). See supra
note 23.
108. See supra note 82.
109. See cases cited supra notes 22-24.
110. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 62, § 15.31, at 4-26.
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attractiveness, the sexual component of the job is aggressive and
outright in both degree and intensity. Here, the sex-linked aspects
of the job predominate over the job's sex-neutral aspects. The
employee's physical, and particularly her sexual, attractiveness is
"reasonably necessary" to the normal operation of the particular
business.111 The employer need only demonstrate that substan-
tially all pregnant women cannot perform the dominant job
duty 1 2 and that only non-pregnant women possess the requisite
physical and, in particular, the sexual attractivenes which allows
them to procure customers successfully. 113 The employer has thus
established that physical and particularly sexual attractiveness,
defined as freedom from pregnancy, is a BFOQ. Accordingly, the
employer may legally discharge or demand the employee's leave of
absence from the job once she becomes visibly pregnant unless the
employee can demonstrate that the employer's articulated reasons
for the employment requirement are a pretext for discrimination." 4
The Anomalous Result
The application of the BFOQ exception to the employer's require-
ment that female employees be physically, and particularly sexu-
ally, attractive because this characteristic, defined as freedom
from pregnancy, is essential to her job brings about a curious
result, one which sharply conflicts with Title VII's goal of provid-
ing and maintaining equal employment opportunities for women." 5
Congress created the BFOQ defense to be an exception to Title
VII's prohibition against sex discrimination. It therefore allows
dissimilar employment practices based on sex solely in those
instances where one sex and not the other can successfully perform
111. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385,388 (5th Cir.) (the female sex
is not a BFOQ for the position of flight attendant because the non-mechanical, i.e., sex-
linked functions were tangential to the essence of the business), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950
(1971); Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (in order to
recognize sex appeal as a BFOQ for jobs requiring both sex-linked and sex-neutral aspects,
the sex-linked aspects of the job must predominate).
112. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 62, §§ 15.10-15.20, at 4-17 to 4-22.
113. See supra note 81. Examples of these types of jobs are the cocktail waitress, the
Playboy Bunny, the burlesque dancer, and any other kind of job where the EEOC has
recognized sex as a BFOQ. They reach their quintessence in the prostitute. See supra note
99.
114. See supra note 82.
115. S. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4749,4754-55.
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the job, because the characteristics necessary for the job's perfor-
mance are possessed uniquely by members of that sex.116 The
BFOQ exception, however, is applied exclusively to women when
the employer asserts that the female employee's physical and sex-
ual attractiveness is so integral to the job that her employment can
legally be terminated once she becomes visibly pregnant. Courts
are thus being asked to justify discriminatory treatment of preg-
nant women on the basis that their pregnancy renders them less
physically and sexually attractive than other women.
The effect of applying the BFOQ exception to this situation is to
disenfranchise women of jobs when they exercise their right to
bear children." 7 Courts will thus perpetuate the subtle, unin-
tended, and often residual discrimination which flows from "stereo-
typed characterizations" which operate to "'freeze' the status quo
of prior discriminatory practices""18 by condoning attitudes which
continue to view women as marginal workers whose jobs can be
divested once they become pregnant. Courts will additionally frus-
trate Congress' intent to remove all "artificial, arbitrary and
unnecessary [employment] barriers" 119 which discriminate on the
basis of sex.
Given this result, courts should scrutinize the effect of terminat-
ing women's jobs once they become visibly pregnant to determine
whether it accords with Congress' intent "to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from
sex stereotyping."'120 Because treating women as a means of pur-
veying varying degrees of sexual gratification is sex stereo-
typing,121 the employer's asserted justification for the dissimilar
116. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
117. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
118. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430(1971).
119. Id. at 431. Congress has directed the thrust of Title VII to the consequences of
employment practices in order to determine whether they operate invidiously on impermis-
sible classifications. Id. Bujel v. Borman Food Stores, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 141,145 (E.D. Mich.
1974) ("the courts ... must be specially vigilant in examining all forms of employer-made
rules and regulations that tend to make it more difficult for a woman to get, enjoy or keep a
job.").
120. Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971). Accord Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228,235-36 (5th Cir. 1969);
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 511 F.2d 199, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 424
U.S. 737 (1976).
121. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 345 (1977) (that women are seductive, sexual
objects is the most insidious of old myths). Accord EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp.
599, 610 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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treatment of pregnant women should be seen for what it is: a
pretext for discrimination. That the ostensibly neutral job require-
ment of physical and sexual attractiveness divests of jobs a dis-
proportionate number of women-all those visibly pregnant-
shows this requirement to be a pretext for discrimination.
Finally, the employer's asserted justification for his dissimilar
treatment of pregnant and non-pregnant women is an attempt to
establish employer and customer preferences as a BFOQ excep-
tion. By asserting that the female employee's physical and sexual
attractiveness is vitiated by her pregnancy, the employer is in
effect asking the courts to allow customer preferences to determine
when women should be forced from their jobs. To disenfranchise
women of jobs because employers and customers believe that
pregnancy renders them physically and sexually unattractive
hardly accords with Title VII's mandate that sex discrimination
not be tolerated under the guise of physical properties possessed by
one sex.
122
CONCLUSION
Congress amended Title VII by passing the Pregnancy Discrim-
ination Act expressly to redefine sex discrimination to include
pregnancy discrimination. The PDA clarified and reaffirmed Con-
gress' original intent to protect working women against all forms
of sex discrimination, including those based on pregnancy.
Congress left untouched, however, an express Title VII exemp-
tion to sex discrimination. This BFOQ defense allows employers to
justify their dissimilar treatment toward pregnant employees and
to discriminate openly on the basis of sex without violating Title
VII. The BFOQ defense, however, was meant to apply to situations
where courts had to determine whether characteristics possessed
by one sex and not the other were reasonably necessary for the
successful performance of the job and normal operation of the
particular business. The BFOQ exception, therefore, was not
created to allow employers and customers to determine at what
point pregnancy should divest women of their jobs when this
"objectively identifiable physical condition with unique character-
istics" renders them less physically and sexually attractive than
nonpregnant females.
122. E.g., Jefferies v. Harris County Community Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1033-34 (5th Cir.
1980); Harris v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 413, 431 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
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Congress' intent in passing Title VII was to provide and main-
tain equal employment opportunities in the job market for both
sexes. The BFOQ exception to Title VII's general mandate of equal
opportunity in employment for all allows employers to discharge
or demand the leave of absence from visibly pregnant employees
when the dominant aspect of the employee's job and the essence of
the employer's business are to provide vicarious or "attenuated"
sex. Because divesting women of their jobs on the basis of preg-
nancy does not accord with Congress' intent, the propriety of
applying the BFOQ defense to instances of sex discrimination
based on pregnancy should be examined to determine whether
pregnancy should be removed from this express statutory excep-
tion. Race discrimination always has been excluded from the oper-
ation of the BFOQ exception. Given that Congress has recognized
many similarities between race discrimination and sex discrimi-
nation, 123 that both skin color and pregnancy are immutable
characteristics, there is legislative support for also bringing the
latter outside the reach of the BFOQ exception.
JACQUELINE H. LOWER
123. S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971).
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